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“Constitution[al] principle[s] are too unrefined, standing alone,” to resolve
issues that matter most.
—Professor Steven D. Smith1
“[T]he ideals of neutrality and equality [are] incapable of supporting a viable
liberal community.”
—Professor Steven D. Smith2

I. Introduction: Of Equality and Constitutionalism
The two most prominent constitutional and jurisprudential principles that have been invoked in support of claims for legalization of
same-sex marriage may be claims of “right” and claims of “equality.”
The “rights” claims assert that there is a basic, recognized legal right
to marry a person of the same-sex. The “equality” claims are based on
notions of equivalence, tolerance, respect, fairness, and pluralism. Of
those, the most effective and successful claims for same-sex marriage
have been based on equality principles emphasizing equivalence, tolerance, and fairness.
This paper examines the extent to which equality claims have been
used to require the legalization of same-sex marriage in American state
and federal legal doctrine, as a matter of comparative interstate constitutional law. It also examines whether and how equality principles have
been used to require the legalization of same-sex marriage in other nations, an exercise of comparative intercountry constitutional law. It
then considers whether equality principles justify requiring the legalization of same-sex marriage as a matter of general jurisprudential principles.
The paper begins in Part II, by describing the status of same-sex
marriage in the United States of America and in the world. It also reviews the text of state and national constitutional provisions regarding
same-sex marriage and the controlling judicial opinions in search of
the jurisprudential theories that underlie the constitutional legalization or rejection of same-sex marriage.
Part III considers whether equality principles require the legalization of same-sex marriage as a matter of U.S. constitutional doctrine
and human rights doctrines. The prevailing and most coherent answer

1. Steven D. Smith, Getting Over Equality 2 (2001) (internal quotation mark omitted).
2. Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 305, 307 (1990).
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to the doctrinal question is that in most legal systems in this country
and in the world, equality principles are not interpreted to require legalization of same-sex marriage as a matter of constitutional or fundament human rights doctrines, but that in only very few legal systems
have equality doctrines been interpreted to require legalization of
same-sex marriage. Judicial imposition of same-sex marriage by means
of creative interpretation and extension of equality principles of constitutional law is illegitimate.
Likewise, Part IV shows that as a matter of general moral philosophy or jurisprudence, equality principles provide little support for
claims to legalize same-sex marriage. However, liberty provides a solution to the conundrum of equality and tolerance, and upon that basis
the equality principles might support legal recognition of some recognition of same-sex unions with benefits, privileges, and responsibilities.
In conclusion, Part V summarizes that in both practice and theory,
equality principles provide little support for legalization of same-sex
marriage in U.S. constitutional doctrine, comparative international
constitutional law, or as a matter of the general jurisprudential, or human rights principles.
It is apparent that in politics, law, and jurisprudential principles
“equality” has many different dimensions and many varied meanings.
For example, the notion of equality in one sense can mean equivalence;
in another aspect it can mean tolerance; it can also mean nondiscrimination; in another usage, it can mean neutrality; in another perspective it
can mean pluralism; and in another dimension, equality can mean respect
or dignity. Each of these equality principles provides stronger or
weaker support for the claim for legalization of same-sex marriage than
others. Whether equality requires legalization of same-sex marriage
depends in part on which definition or dimension of equality is used.
It also appears that which meaning or dimension of equality is used
and how it is interpreted and applied depends in part on who is using
and applying it. The structural context is very important; “who decides” (i.e., which branch, agency, level or process of government
makes the decision) profoundly influences which meaning of equality
will be used and how it will be interpreted. In the United States, the
method used to decide the issue has been driven by the substance of
the policy, and the method and decision-maker have largely controlled
the outcome. When democratic, grass-roots-based methods are used
to settle the issue, the outcome is likely to be a prohibition of same-sex
marriage. In contrast, the more non-democratic and elitist or insulated
the method and decision-making body, the more likely it is that the
491
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outcome will be the legalization of same-sex marriage. The closer the
decision-making gets to the people (through direct democratic process
or electorally-accountable processes and branches), the more likely the
decision is to reject same-sex marriage and the claim that equality requires legalizing same-sex marriage. However, the further removed
from the people (especially when remotely accountable or life-tenured
judges are making the decision), the more likely it is that the decision
will conclude that equality principles require legalizing same-sex marriage.
Additionally, there appears to be a strong social-cultural influence
upon which meaning or aspect of equality will be used and how it will
be interpreted in determining whether equality requires legalization of
same-sex marriage. For example, in the United States, the social and
cultural values generally tend to reflect conservative notions of equality
and to favor application of limited or conservative interpretations of
equality. Thus, in forty-one3 of fifty states, conservative notions of
equality prevail, and those 82% of the states do not permit same-sex
marriage. In over 90% of the states (thirty-one out of thirty-four states
to date) where the issue of legalizing same-sex marriage had come before voters, same-sex marriage has been rejected soundly. All thirtyone states4 where same-sex marriage has been constitutionally barred
have accomplished that by democratic processes; no court in America
has construed a state (or federal) constitution as forbidding the legalization of same-sex marriage. On the other hand, in half of the American states where same-sex marriage ever has been or now is allowed,
the legalization of same-sex marriage was decreed or initiated by judicial interpretation of a constitutional provision.5 Interestingly, by con-

3. See infra Appendix I.A.
4. See infra Appendix II.
5. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (holding that California statutes
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples was unconstitutional and violated the state’s equal-protection clause for same-sex couples—a ruling that was overturned by California voters less than
five months later when they approved Proposition 8); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957
A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that Connecticut laws restricting marriage to heterosexual couples violated same-sex couples’ equal-protection rights); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa
2009) (holding that statutes limiting civil marriage to heterosexual unions violated the equalprotection rights of same-sex couples seeking marriage licenses, and thus statutory language
should be interpreted and applied in a manner allowing gay and lesbian couples full access to civil
marriages); In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004) (holding
that civil unions are not equal to marriages and, thus, allowing same-sex marriages in Massachusetts); Goodridge v. Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the
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trast, outside of the United States, same-sex marriage has been legalized by democratic processes mostly; in nine of the eleven nations6 that
have legalized same-sex marriage, including all eight European nations
where same-sex marriage is legal, plus in Argentina, same-sex marriage
was legalized by legislative processes, and in only two of those nations
(Canada and South Africa) was that policy initiated by judicial shove
or nudge. So the democratic values of the society and culture are reflected in whether constitutional equality provisions are deemed to require legalization of same-sex marriage.
Nearly all nations in the world today are “democratic” in some
sense; but “democracy” (like “equality”) has many meanings, and there
are different degrees of commitment to and implementation of democratic principles of government. The circumvention of citizens in the
processes of deciding highly controversial policy issues, such as
whether to legalize same-sex marriage in a jurisdiction,7 may be a good
measure of the degree of commitment to, and the functional validity
of, democratic processes in a particular jurisdiction. So the way in
which the political battles over same-sex marriage are decided may implicate democratic constitutionalism in some very profound ways that
may have deeper significance for political society than the marriage
policy preference itself.

II.

The Status of Marriage and Other Domestic
Relationships in the Law
A. Same-Sex Marriage and Equivalent Civil Unions

1. Same-sex unions have marriage-like status in very few jurisdictions
In the United States of America there has been a vigorous, determined movement to legalize same-sex marriage for nearly twenty
years.8 As Appendix I.A. shows, since 2004, same-sex marriage has

state of Massachusetts may not deny the protections, benefits, and obligations of marriage to
same-sex unions); see also Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 8 (2010); Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864
(Vt. 1999); 2009 Vt. Acts & Resolves 33.
6. See infra Appendix I.B.
7. See Dominique Ludvigson, Circumventing Citizens on Marriage: A Survey 3
(The Heritage Foundation 2012) (“Largely unable to redefine marriage through democratic processes, advocates have resorted to the courts to do so.”).
8. Kevin G. Clarkson, David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People’s Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 Alaska L. Rev. 213 (1999); David
Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of Marriage, 38 S. Tex. L.
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been legalized in nine9 of the fifty United States of America, as well as
in the District of Columbia and in two (of 564) American Indian
Tribes.10 Also, same-sex unions with legal status and benefits equivalent to marriage (herein “civil unions”) have been created in eight
other U.S. states.11 Thus, seventeen U.S. states give same-sex relations
marital or marriage-equivalent legal status and benefits. Additionally,
two other states now allow some form of same-sex partnership registration with limited, selected benefits—less than the total bundle of
benefits extended to marriages or civil unions.12
Globally, as Appendix I.B. shows, same-sex marriage has been legalized in ten or eleven nations of 193 sovereign nations recognized by
the United Nations (depending on whether South Africa’s ambiguous
law is counted as creating same-sex marriages or civil unions), all since
the year 2000 when the Netherlands became the first jurisdiction in
the world to allow same-sex marriage.13 Additionally, same-sex unions
Rev. 1, 11 (1997); David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawaii Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning
and Constitutionality, 22 Haw. L. Rev. 19 (2000); David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage: As
Hawaii Goes, First Things, Apr. 1997, at 33.
9. The number of states increased from six to nine as a result of November 2012 ballot
initiatives in Maine, Maryland, and Washington. Chelsea J. Carter & Allison Brennan, Maryland,
Maine, Washington Approve Same-Sex Marriage; 2 States Legalize Pot, CNN Politics (Nov. 7,
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/01/politics/ballot-initiatives.
10. See infra Appendix I (including in the list states that voted to legalize same-sex marriage in 2012, regardless of when those new laws go into effect). Additionally, California legalized
same-sex marriage by judicial decree briefly in 2008, but the voters quickly overturned that by
passing Proposition 8 in November 2008. Lower-court rulings by state courts in Hawaii and
(non-finally) in Alaska also legalized or ruled in favor of same-sex marriage, but before those
rulings became effective, voters in each state adopted amendments to the state constitutions to
prohibit same-sex marriage. Charles M. Cannizzaro, Marriage in California: Is the Federal Lawsuit
Against Proposition 8 About Applying the Fourteenth Amendment or Preserving Federalism?, 38 Pepp.
L. Rev. 161, 162–66 (2010).
11. The term “civil unions” is an inexact term, generally used (and used herein) to refer to
formal same-sex legal relationships that enjoy all, or substantially all, of the benefits, privileges,
and duties of marriage. However, such relationships are denominated “domestic partnerships” in
some states, including California and Nevada. Cal. Fam. Code § 297 (West 2005); Nev. Rev.
Stat. §§ 122A.010–122A.510 (2009). By the same token, formally-created and legally-recognized same-sex legal relationships that are afforded less than identical, or substantially-identical,
legal rights, duties and benefits are generally called “domestic partnerships,” but could just as
well be called “civil unions.” See also Lynn D. Wardle, Counting the Costs of Civil Unions: Some
Potential Detrimental Effects on Family Law, 11 Widener J. Pub. L. 401 (2002).
12. See infra Appendix I.A.
13. One of these eleven nations, South Africa, enacted a “Civil Union Act” in 2006 that
allows same-sex couples to enter that new status by using a marriage ceremony or civil partnership registration, allows the relationship to be called a marriage or civil partnership, and grants
most of the same rights to such relationships as are enjoyed by marriages. But despite the use of
the label and formation ceremony of “marriage,” the legal status created is technically a “civil
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equivalent to marriage have been created in seventeen or sixteen additional nations (again depending on whether South Africa is counted in
the same-sex marriage list). Moreover, same-sex registrations with
some limited benefits are provided in at least five other nations.14
Thus, from no nations or American states allowing same-sex marriage in 2000 (and throughout all prior legal history), there now are
ten (or arguably eleven) nations and nine U.S. states with same-sex
marriage at the beginning of 2013; and from only three nations and no
U.S. states with marriage-equivalent civil unions in 1995, there are
seventeen (or arguably sixteen) nations and eight American states with
such unions at the dawn of 2013. Additionally, another half-dozen nations and two states provide limited recognition and specific benefits
for same-sex couples. In summary, today about one-seventh of all sovereign nations and one-third of the American states now offer marriage
or marriage-equivalent legal status and benefits to same-sex couples.
2. Same-sex unions lack marriage-like status in most jurisdictions
The other side of the foregoing statistics is that in forty-one of the
fifty U.S. states and in 183 of the 193 sovereign nations in the world
(or, arguably, 182—depending on how South Africa’s law is classified),
same-sex marriage is prohibited or not generally permitted. Additionally, the “backlash” grassroots movement rejecting same-sex marriage
has turned out to be quite substantial in America and internationally.
In the past decade thirty-one states (62% of all American states) have
passed state-constitutional amendments defining marriage as the union of husband and wife.15 In May 2012, a state marriage amendment

union.” So even though South Africa usually is counted with the nations that have legalized
“same-sex marriage,” as a matter of legal analysis, it probably does not belong there but should
be listed with the nations that have legalized “civil unions.” Civil Union Act 29441 of 2006 (S.
Afr.), available at http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=67843.
14. See infra Appendix I.B. A few subordinate jurisdictions (such as individual cities or
counties or provinces) have also recognized or created same-sex marriage, but most such inferior
jurisdictions lack the governance authority to regulate marriage and similar domestic relationships.
15. See infra Appendix II.A; see also Ala. Const., amend. 774; Alaska Const., art. I, §
25; Ariz. Const., art. 30, § 1 (Prop. 102); Ark. Const., amend. 83; Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5
(Prop. 8); Colo. Const., art. II, § 31; Fla. Const. art. 1, § 27; Ga. Const., art I, § 4, para. 1;
Idaho Const., art. III, § 28; Kan. Const. art. XV, § 16; Ky. Const., § 233A; La. Const., art.
XII, § 15; Mich. Const., art. I, § 25; Miss. Const., § 263-A; Mo. Const., art. I, § 33; Mont.
Const., art. XIII, § 7; Neb. Const., art. I, § 29; Nev. Const., art. I, § 21; N.D. Const., art.
XI, § 28; Ohio Const., art. XV, § 11; Okla. Const., art. II, § 35; Or. Const., art. XV, § 5a;
S.C. Const., art. XVII, § XV; S.D. Const., XXI, § 9; Tenn. Const., art. XI, § 18; Tex.
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was approved by voters in North Carolina with over 61% of the vote.16
But in November 2012, voters in Minnesota became the first voters in
thirty-two states to decline to pass a state marriage amendment, with
nearly 52.6% of the voters there rejecting it.17 In all 32 states in which
same-sex marriage had been on the ballot before November 2012 (including Maine where in 2009 a new law allowing same-sex marriage
was rejected by the “people’s veto”) the people had decisively rejected
same-sex marriage. Now there are forty-one states (including thirtyone with constitutional amendments on point) rejecting same-sex marriage, and nine states allowing same-sex marriage. Overall, adding together all the votes, the total vote against same-sex marriage in the
thirty-four states where voters have voted on state marriage amendments is over sixty percent (62%).18
Twenty of the existing state constitutional amendments also prohibit the creation of marriage-equivalent same-sex civil unions, regardless of what it is called.19 At least forty-one states have passed their own
“defense of marriage” policies by statute, constitutional amendment,
or both. Such defense-of-marriage policies effectively prohibit courts
in those states from recognizing same-sex marriages performed in
other jurisdictions, and also express strong public policy in the states
barring same-sex marriage recognition.20 Nearly two-thirds of Amer-

Const., art. I, § 32; Utah Const., art. I, § 29; Va. Const., art. I, § 15-A; Wis. Const., art.
XIII, § 13.
16. North Carolina Same-Sex Marriage, Amendment 1 (May 2012), Ballotpedia.org,
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/North_Carolina_Same-Sex_Marriage,_Amendment_1_%28May_2012%29 (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
17. Minnesota Same-Sex Marriage Amendment, Amendment 1 (2012), Ballotpedia.org,
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Minnesota_Same-Sex_Marriage_Amendment,_Amendment_1_%282012%29 (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
18. See Lynn D. Wardle, Involuntary Imports: Williams, Lutwak, the Defense of Marriage
Act, Federalism, and “Thick” and “Thin” Conceptions of Marriage, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 771, app. at
826 (2012) (recognizing that those figures must be adjusted by the 2012 votes in North Carolina,
Maine, Maryland, and Washington).
19. See infra Appendix II.B.
20. This includes the thirty substantive marriage amendment states, see infra Appendix
II.A., plus the following states which have adopted statutory same-sex marriage non-recognition
acts but no constitutional provision. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-101 (2007); Cal. Fam. Code
§ 308.5 (West 2004); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 101 (West 2006); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.212
(West 2010); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-3 (1999); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/212 (West
1999); Ind. Code Ann. § 31–11–1–1 (2007); Iowa Code §595.2 (2002); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 517.01 (West, 2006); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-1.2 (2011); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1704
(West 2010). W. Va. Code § 48-2-603 (2002).
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ican states (thirty-three states) clearly reject and prohibit either marriage or any marriage-like legal status or marital benefits for same-sex
couples.21 Currently, forty-one American states (82%) recognize only
dual-gender marriage—defining marriage as a union between a man
and a woman only.
Internationally, the legal rejection of same-sex marriage is the
dominant and growing rule of national constitutional law. Forty-seven
nations—twenty-four percent (24%) of the 193 sovereign nations recognized by the United Nations—have constitutional provisions that
expressly define or by gendered terms clearly refer to marriage as a
conjugal union of a man and a woman.22 All but one of these constitutional provisions has been adopted since 1970.23 By contrast, no national constitution expressly protects or requires same-sex marriage.24

21. See Lynn D. Wardle, A Response to the “Conservative Case” for Same-Sex Marriage: SameSex Marriage and “the Tragedy of the Commons,” 22 BYU J. Pub. L. 441 (2008).
22. See the constitutions of The Republic of Armenia, May 7, 1995, art. 32; The Republic
of Azerbaijan, Nov. 12, 1995, art. 34; The Republic of Belarus, 1994, art. 32; The Federative
Republic of Brazil, 1988, art. 226; The Republic of Bulgaria, July 13, 1991, art. 46; Burkina Faso,
Jun. 2, 1991, art. 23; The Kingdom of Cambodia, Sept. 21, 1993, art. 45; The People’s Republic
of China, 1982, art. 49; Colombia, 1991, art. 42; The Republic of Cuba, 1976, art. 36; The Republic of Ecuador, Oct. 20, 2008, art. 38; Eritrea, May 23, 1997, art. 22; The Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia, Dec. 8, 1994, art. 34; The Second Republic of The Gambia, Aug. 8, 1996,
art. 27; The Republic of Honduras, Jan. 11, 1982, art. 112; Japan, May 3, 1947, art. 24; The
Republic of Latvia, Feb. 15, 1922, art. 110; The Republic of Lithuania, Oct. 25, 1992, art. 38;
The Republic of Malawi, May 18, 1994, art. 22; The Republic of Moldova, July 29, 1994, art. 48;
The Republic of Montenegro, Oct. 19, 2007, art. 71; The Republic of Namibia, 1990, art. 14;
The Republic of Nicaragua, Nov. 19, 1986, art. 72; The Republic of Paraguay, June 20, 1992,
arts. 49–52 ; The Republic of Peru, Oct. 31, 1993, art. 5; The Republic of Poland, Apr. 2, 1997,
art. 18; The Republic of Serbia, art. 62; The Republic of Suriname, Oct. 30, 1987, art. 35; The
Kingdom of Swaziland, 2005, art. 27; The Republic of Tajikistan, Nov. 6, 1994, art. 33; Turkmenistan, Aug. 15, 2003, art. 25; The Republic of Uganda, 1995, art. 31; Ukraine, June 28, 1996,
art. 51; The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 1999, art. 77; The Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
Apr. 18, 1992, art. 64.
23. The Constitution of Japan, which was adopted in 1947, is the only such constitution
adopted before 1970 that limits marriage to male-female couples. Constitution of Japan, supra
note 22.
24. But by creative judicial interpretation of equality provisions, not marriage provisions,
courts in Canada and South Africa have distilled a requirement for legal recognition of same-sex
marriage. See Harrison v. Canada, [2005] NBQB 232, 290 N.B.R.2d 70 (Can.); Minister of Foreign
Affairs v. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) at para. 12 (S. Afr.). It also is reported that a court in Nepal
has ruled that same-sex couples should be able to marry or have some similar status, but that
ruling has not had any legal effect yet. Nepal Lesbian Wedding: U.S. Couple Weds in Nation’s First
Public Same-Sex Ceremony, Huff Post World (June 20, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/20/nepal-lesbian-wedding-us-couple-weds-ceremony_n_880315.html#s294953 (explaining that two women from Denver wed in Nepal, but “[s]amesex marriages are not legal in Nepal . . . . The laws are being drafted . . . .”).
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Additionally, same-sex marriage is prohibited either by statute, common law, or binding legal custom in all nations that do not explicitly
forbid or allow same-sex marriage in their constitutions.
Internationally, the constitutional language of many of the fortyseven25 nations that appear to bar same-sex marriage appears to constitutionalize custom—the custom of marriage being the gender-integrative union of man and women. The language in those constitutional
provisions suggests that the drafters of the constitution may not have
specifically or extensively considered whether the constitution should
prohibit same-sex marriage, but only decided that the established custom of marriage as a dual-gender legal relationship should receive particular constitutional protection. Whether these constitutional provisions will be interpreted as reserving the legal status of marriage
exclusively for (only) male-female couples or merely inclusively (including at least male-female couples) when/if political pressures for samesex marriage arise in those nations is a political question the answer to
which is uncertain. Since the textual implication in most cases is that a
unique constitutional protection was intended to be given to the
unique, historical institution of dual-gender integrative marriages, it is
likely that most of those constitutional provisions will be interpreted
exclusively as reserving the particular status of “marriage” for male-female unions. However, such interpretation does not necessarily bar the
creation of some other domestic status, and perhaps may even allow
granting an equivalent legal status with equivalent legal rights and benefits. Yet, given the special interest politics of same-sex marriage, it is

25. See The Constitutions of The Republic of Armenia, May 7, 1995, art. 32; The Republic of Azerbaijan, Nov. 12, 1995, art. 34; The Republic of Belarus, 1994, art. 32; The Federative
Republic of Brazil, 1988, art. 226; The Republic of Bulgaria, July 13, 1991, art. 46; Burkina Faso,
Jun. 2, 1991, art. 23; The Kingdom of Cambodia, Sept. 21, 1993, art. 45; The People’s Republic
of China, 1982, art. 49; Colombia, 1991, art. 42; The Republic of Cuba, 1976, art. 36; The Republic of Ecuador, Oct. 20, 2008, art. 38; Eritrea, May 23, 1997, art. 22; The Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia, Dec. 8, 1994, art. 34; The Second Republic of The Gambia, Aug. 8, 1996,
art. 27; The Republic of Honduras, Jan. 11, 1982, art. 112; Japan, May 3, 1947, art. 24; The
Republic of Latvia, Feb. 15, 1922, art. 110; The Republic of Lithuania, Oct. 25, 1992, art. 38;
The Republic of Malawi, May 18, 1994, art. 22; The Republic of Moldova, July 29, 1994, art. 48;
The Republic of Montenegro, Oct. 19, 2007, art. 71; The Republic of Namibia, 1990, art. 14;
The Republic of Nicaragua, Nov. 19, 1986, art. 72; The Republic of Paraguay, June 20, 1992,
arts. 49, 50, 51, 52; The Republic of Peru, Oct. 31, 1993, art. 5; The Republic of Poland, Apr. 2,
1997, art. 18; The Republic of Serbia, art. 62; The Republic of Suriname, Oct. 30, 1987, art. 35;
The Kingdom of Swaziland, 2005, art. 27; The Republic of Tajikistan, Nov. 6, 1994, art. 33;
Turkmenistan, Aug. 15, 2003, art. 25; The Republic of Uganda, 1995, art. 31; Ukraine, June 28,
1996, art. 51; The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 1999 art. 77; The Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, Apr. 18, 1992, art. 64.
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not likely that a few of those provisions may be interpreted inclusively
as not disallowing same-sex marriage.
In a few nations the language26 or the history of the drafting27 of
the constitutional provision makes it clear that it was intended specifically to ban same-sex marriage. However, whether such clear intent
and constitutional language will be respected is not certain. The
proper enactment by the citizens of a modern liberal democracy of a
constitutional amendment or provision that specifically and unequivocally is intended to and does explicitly ban same-sex marriage is no
guarantee that other government officers (especially judges) will not
disregard, dismiss, and disobey that constitutional languageas the
federal district and appellate court rulings that, if upheld, will invalidate and overturn Proposition 828 clearly show.29
Less than one-seventh of sovereign nations and just one-third of
the American states allow same-sex couples to marry or offer them another domestic relations legal status with marriage-equivalent legal
benefits. Eighty-three percent (83%) of the nations and sixty-two percent (62%) of the states in this country give no legal domestic relationship status or benefits to same-sex couples.

III. Whether the Constitutional Doctrine of Equality
Supports Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage
Principles of equality, including tolerance and pluralism, have two
dimensions of relevance to the same-sex marriage debates. The first is
the dimension of equality as a doctrine of constitutional law. The second is equality as a general principle of jurisprudence, philosophy, and
legal theory. Both provide little support for the constitutional claims
for same-sex marriage. This part examines the doctrinal equality

26. See, e.g., The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan,
2011, Jul. 9, 2011, art. 15, available at http://bit.ly/ZBghaz (“Every person of marriageable age
shall have the right to marry a person of the opposite sex and to found a family . . . .”); see also Constitution of Latvia, Constitution of Uganda infra note 22.
27. See, e.g., The Fundamental Law of Hungary [Constitution] Apr. 25, 2011, art.
L; Constitution of Latvia, Feb. 22, 1922, ch. VIII, art. 110; see also Pablo Gorondi, Hungary
Passes New Conservative Constitution, Star Tribune (Apr. 18, 2011, 11:55 AM), http://www.startribune.com/printarticle/?id=120060264.
28. Proposition 8 was the 2008 California constitutional amendment banning same-sex
marriage.
29. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom., Perry
v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786
(2012).
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claims.
A. Equality Claims for Same-Sex Marriage in State Constitutional Law
All thirty-one of the state marriage amendments barring same-sex
marriage clearly and emphatically reject the concept that same-sex unions are the same as, or equal to, or equivalent to dual-gendered institution of “marriage.” Indeed, the common, main purposes of all these
state marriage amendments are (1) to constitutionally confirm that
marriage between a man and a woman is a unique relationship, a
uniquely valuable kind of domestic relationship, (2) to constitutionally
limit the legal status of marriage to male-female couples only, and (3)
to constitutionally prohibit giving the legal status of “marriage” to
same-sex relationships. By confining the specific legal institution and
status of “marriage” exclusively to gender-integrating male-female unions, the core, inescapable message of all of these state marriage
amendments is that marriage is a unique and uniquely important legal
and social institution, and that an indispensable element of the value
of marriage as an institution to society is that it unites a man and a
woman. Thus, in a significant majority (62%) of the American states,
the peoplethe ultimate source and ultimate authority on the meaning of constitutional rights and dutieshave rejected the proposal that
same-sex couples and male-female couples are equal in terms of the
purposes and qualities of marriage.
These popularly-enacted constitutional provisions are not merely
significant politically, but they also are very significant for state constitutional law doctrine. The 2008-09 scenario in California illustrates
this point. After the California Supreme Court in May 2008 interpreted the state constitution as mandating the legalization of same-sex
marriage (based in part on its interpretation of an equality principle),30
the people of California in November 2008 voted to amend their state
constitution by adopting Proposition 8 that defined marriage as the
union of a man and a woman.31 When that amendment was attacked
by advocates of same-sex marriage, the state supreme court rejected
that challenge, respected the constitutional will of the people, and upheld the state marriage amendment.32 Thus, as a matter of clearly-expressed state constitutional law in nearly two-thirds of the states, the

30. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 419, 428 (Cal. 2008).
31. Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5.
32. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (2009).
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constitutional equality claim to same-sex marriage has been decisively
rejected.
Twenty of those thirty-one state marriage amendments contain
words like “equivalent” or “similar” or other words describing comparability to prohibit not only same-sex marriage but also forbid creating
or legally recognizing domestic relationships for same-sex couples (and
in some states also other couples) that are or present themselves as being “equivalent” or substantially “similar” to dual-gendered marriage
in status or substance.33 These amendments put an exclamation point
after their rejection of the equality claim for same-sex unionsrepudiating not only the claim for same-sex unions as legally entitled to
institutional marriage status—but also rejecting the claim of equivalence in eligibility for the same or similar bundles of benefits and privileges. These twenty marriage amendments express one or both of two
equality value positions: (1) that same-sex (and in some states, other
non-marital) domestic relationships do not merit (deserve or justify or
need) the same or equivalent of legal status, benefits, privileges, rights
and responsibilities as are provided to male-female marital unions; or
(2) that conferring equal or equivalent-to-marital legal packages of
benefits, duties and responsibilities upon same-sex (and, usually, other
non-marital) domestic relations creates inequality that could harm and
undermine or endanger the more important gender-integrating social
institution of marriage or would harm or endanger society or particular vulnerable members of society. Both potential positions of these
amendments clearly reject the claim of the equality and equivalence of
same-sex unions to marriage.34
However, more than one-third of these thirty-one state marriage
amendments (eleven of them) do not bar the granting of equivalent
legal rights and benefits to same-sex (and other) couples under another
legal status, such as “civil unions.” This suggests that those eleven
states and the eight states that have civil unions35 reject the claim that

33. See infra Appendix II.A (listing the twenty states that bar civil unions equivalent to
marriage). The “equality” being forbidden in these twenty state marriage amendments is between
marriage and other domestic relationships. The words “equal” or “equality” do not appear in any
of the thirty-one state marriage amendments.
34. That is, they express the view that the relationship contributions to society of such
alternative unions are not equal or equivalent value to society as those of male-female marriages.
35. The term “civil union” describes a legal domestic-relationship status that provides all
or most of the (and functionally equivalent) benefits, privileges, rights, and duties of marriage to
same-sex (and sometimes other) couples who are not eligible to marry. The states that have created “civil unions” but call them by some other label, such as “domestic partnerships,” include
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same-sex unions are the same as, or are fully equal or equivalent to
marriage as a comprehensive legal status or legal institution. These
eleven states do not necessarily reject the claim that same-sex couples
who want to make a life-long legal commitment to each other should
be able to receive legal benefits, privileges, rights, and responsibilities
that are generally equivalent to, comparable to, similar to, or the same
as those available to a married male-female couple. Nor do they accept
as a matter of constitutional certainty the claim that the contributions
to society of same-sex unions are equal or equivalent to those of malefemale marital unions in terms of their meriting the conferral of equal
or equivalent non-marital domestic relationships status, benefits, duties, and responsibilities. They do not accept as a matter of constitutional certainty the claim that conferring equal or equivalent non-marital domestic relationships status, benefits, duties, and responsibilities
upon same-sex couples would not harm, undermine or endanger the
important gender-integrating social institution of marriage, or that to
do so would not harm society and particular (vulnerable) members of
society. Instead, they presumably believe that such claims and arguments should be considered and decided by the normal legislative processes, or they simply do not believe such blanket, absolute, non-equivalence claims regarding extension of marriage-like benefits, privileges,
and duties to same-sex and other non-marital couples.
As a largely unmentioned collateral effect, all thirty-one of the
state marriage amendments clearly define marriage as a monogamous
relationship only. By defining marriage as the union of “one man and
one woman,” or the union of “a man and a woman” they clearly, constitutionally exclude polygamous and other polyamorous unions from
eligibility for “marital” status. They further directly prohibit recognition of polygamous and polyamorous relationships as “marriages.”
Since the growing Islamic faith allows polygamy,36 and since there recently has been some additional, unrelated interest in and promotion

California, Oregon, Colorado, Nevada, and Wisconsin. See sources cited supra note 11 and accompanying text. Thus, 38% of the states constitutionally ban same-sex marriage, while eight
other states have created “civil unions.”
36. See Napp Nazworth, Religion Census: Increase in Evangelicals, Mormons, Muslims; Decrease in Catholics, Mainline Protestants, Christian Post (May 2, 2012, 6:08 AM),
http://bit.ly/Z3AQ0p (“A decennial census of U.S. religions in Americans was released Tuesday
by the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies . . . . The results show a dramatic
increase in the number of . . . Muslims. . . . Muslims saw the greatest growth rate among the five
main religious groups studied. Their numbers increased by 66.7 percent in the 2010 census from
a decade earlier.”).
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of polyamory,37 this aspect of the state marriage amendments may settle an emerging marriage issue constitutionally at the state level before
it emerges as a full-blown social issue. One wonders if the implications
of the marriage amendments for polyamory, today so noncontroversial
and neglected, in thirty or forty years might become the most controversial and significant.
B. Equality Claims for Same-Sex Marriage in U.S. Constitutional Law
The constitutional doctrine of Equal Protection in American jurisprudence recognizes that it is not a violation of constitutional equality to treat different things differently. “The Constitution [of the
United States] does not require things which are different in fact . . .
to be treated in law as though they were the same.”38 Equal protection
doctrine “embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases alike
but may treat unlike cases accordingly.”39 The U.S. Supreme Court
has long recognized that “[d]ifferences in circumstances beget appropriate differences in law. The Equal Protection Clause was not designed to compel uniformity in the face of difference.”40 Accordingly,
“discrimination with respect to things that are different” does not violate the Equal Protection clause.41
Professor Philip B. Kurland distinguished two ways in which the
equal protection clause has been used to restrain the power of the state
to treat people differently.
In its more general, less meaningful, and most used formulation, the

37. “[P]ost-modern polygamy has moved from being a utopian dream or an interesting
thought experiment, to being a real, albeit fringe, American social practice.” Maura I. Strassberg,
The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering Polyamory, 31 Cap. U. L. Rev. 439, 442
(2003); see 3 The Lesbian Polyamory Reader: Open Relationships, Non-Monogamy, and
Casual Sex (Marcia Munson & Judith P. Stelboum eds., 1999); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s
Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 277
(2004); Lynne Marie Kohm, Moral Realism and the Adoption of Children by Homosexuals, 38 New
Eng. L. Rev. 643, 660 (2004) (“[T]he same-sex marriage debate is quickly moving toward polyamory . . .”); ’Ann E. Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation, 79 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1461 (2011);
Marisa Black, Note, Beyond Child Bride Polygamy: Polyamory, Unique Familial Constructions, and the
Law, 8 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 497 (2006); Stanley Kurtz, Beyond Gay Marriage: The Road to Polyamory,
Wkly. Standard, Aug. 4, 2003, http://bit.ly/YxCg6U.
38. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308–09 (1966) (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S.
141, 147 (1940)); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 445, 481–82 (1980) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
39. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216
(1982)).
40. Whitney v. State Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 309 U.S. 530, 542 (1940).
41. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 624 (1934).
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Court has held that all persons within a class must be similarly treated
by the state. That leaves unresolved the hard issues of how the class
may be defined and how much leeway is left to the relevant government body in defining the class. Thus: “[W]hat the equal protection
of the law requires is equality of burdens upon those in like situation
or condition.”42

Insofar as gender has any meaning whatever, it inherently establishes that men and women belong to different gender classes. Thus,
this branch of equality jurisprudence does not compel same-sex marriage.
A second utilization of the [equal protection] clause in terms of the
power of the state to classify is meaningful, definite, and usually ignored. Here the proposition is that there are certain factors that a
state is precluded from taking into consideration in establishing classes. Mr. Justice Jackson called these “neutral facts” and thereby, unknowingly, damned the standard to purgatory or worse. Concurring
in Edwards v. California, he said: “The mere state of being without
funds is a neutral fact—constitutionally an irrelevance, like race,
creed, or color.” Mr. Justice Harlan I, in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, thought that color was a neutral fact and could not form the
basis for imposing a burden or failing to grant a benefit. “Our Constitution,” he said, “is color-blind . . . .” It has been suggested that
religion is a neutral fact on the basis of which the state may not classify either to grant or deny benefits or to impose or relieve from burdens. To date, however, the “neutral facts” notion has been utilized
by the Court only to prevent unfavorable discrimination by the
state.43

Marriage is not only intimately and extensively involved with state
regulation and channeling of procreation and child-rearing, but also to
the formation of families that entail learning to live intimately with
persons of the other gender. Thus, with the social interest in sustaining
the core social institution in which men and women unite to complement and enhance the strengths and weaknesses of the other gender,44
it is irrational and unrealistic to insist that gender is a “neutral fact”
42. Philip B. Kurland, Foreword: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the Government, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 146 (1964) (quoting S.C. ex rel.
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McMaster, 237 U.S. 63, 72–73 (1915)).
43. Kurland, supra note 42 at 146–47 (footnote omitted).
44. Lynn D. Wardle, “Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of
States Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 771, 779–80 (2001) (listing
eight social interests in and legal purposes of marriage).
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regarding the social interests in marriage.
Nor does eliminating gender-integration in marriage further
equality-as-tolerance. William Eskridge has linked the gay rights constitutional jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court to the principle
of tolerance:
The jurisprudence of tolerance is a conservative theory of judicial review, and it is the theory that best justifies, and perhaps inspires, the
positions taken by the Court in Lawrence and other recent gay rights
cases. Ironically, it is a theory that justifies a fair amount of activist
judicial review—not just the invalidation of consensual sodomy laws
in Lawrence, but also the Court’s ruling that a sexual-orientation antidiscrimination law could not constitutionally be applied to require
the Boy Scouts to retain an openly gay scoutmaster. [Boy Scouts of
Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).] What the cases share is the
Court’s commitment to lowering the stakes of identity politics. The
LGBT social movement wants to persuade America that gay is good,
while the traditional family values (TFV) countermovement wants to
persuade America that many gay rights would undermine the family,
marriage, and other cherished institutions. This is a fine debate for
America to have. The Court is simply insisting that the players not
hit below the belt and turn a fair fight into a brawl.45

The principle of “equality-as-tolerance” has been promoted to
support same-sex marriage.46 Interestingly, as Professor Bruce Hafen
noted many years ago, the law can regulate relationships in three ways:
prohibit, tolerate, or prefer them. Historically, same-sex relationships
were prohibited by the law. On the other hand, marriage is the classic
example of a relationship that historically was, and today still is, preferred in law.47 In the past few decades, the laws in many jurisdictions
45. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower
the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1021, 1025 (2004); see also Linda C. McClain,
Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives: Beyond “Empty” Toleration to Toleration as Respect, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 19, 22–23 (1998) (arguing that equality-as-tolerance is too
narrow and equality-as-respect would justify same-sex marriage).
46. Id.; see also James D. Wilets, International Human Rights Law and Sexual Orientation,
18 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1, 72 (1994) (quoting Kurt Krickler, Report on ILGA’s
Participation in the CSCE Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension Issues Warsaw, 27
Sept. –14 Oct. 1993, Euro-Letter (Int’l Lesbian and Gay Ass’n), Nov. 21, 1993) (“Tolerance
plays also an important part in the attitude of the state towards persons of different sexual belonging.”).
47. Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual PrivacyBalancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 463, 546–47 (1983) (“The law creates
a natural spectrum with protected activity on one extreme, prohibited activity on the other extreme, and a broad range of permitted activity in the middle.”); see also Smith, supra note 2, at
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have moved to tolerate (neither prohibit nor privilege) same-sex relationships. Advocates of same-sex marriage seek to move the law further. However, because marriage is a highly preferred, privileged legal
relationship, the claim for same-sex marriage is not merely a claim for
tolerance, but a claim for special privilege and special preference.
Likewise, equality-as-respect fails to mandate legalization of samesex marriage. It is important to respect persons in same-sex relations
as individuals with full civil rights. But marriage should not be taken
hostage to prove respect. Giving marriage licenses to people is not necessary to respect people; our marriage laws deny marriage licenses to
many people whose relationships are incompatible with the special
purposes of marriage such as siblings and other closely-related persons,
under-age persons, and already-married persons.48
The crux of the constitutional dispute is whether gender-integration is important for the achievement of significant state interests concerning the regulation of marriage. Assuming for the sake of argument
that a heightened (at least intermediate) standard of review may be applied, establishment of the equality claim for same-sex marriage requires the establishment of at least one of two critical propositions: (1)
that there are no significant differences between men and women, or
(2) that any gender differences that do exist are irrelevant to (or do not
significantly advance) the important purposes the state has for regulating marriage.
The first (androgyny or gender-neutrality) proposition not only
flies in the face of common experience and common sense,49 but also
contradicts a legion of gender-equality cases. These cases recognize
not only that men and women are different in profound ways, but
acknowledge that those gender differences make different and distinctly
valuable contributions to society in innumerable ways that enrich society

308–12; Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996
BYU L. Rev. 1, 61 (1996) (“Legalizing same-sex marriage would ignore the distinction between
tolerance and preference by extending the highest legal preferences to relationships which our
society historically has condemned and which, even now, the most sympathetic states have chosen
only to tolerate. The confusion comes when proponents of same-sex marriage assert that because
homosexual relations are tolerated they are entitled to a state-endorsed preferred status.” (footnote omitted)).
48. See Lynn D. Wardle, Christopher L. Blakesley & Jacqueline Y. Parker, 1
Contemporary Family Law, chps. 2–3 (1988) (describing numerous marital restrictions and
formalities in state laws).
49. Jennifer Thieme, The Freedom to Marry: A Liberal Value that Conservatives Should Shun,
Daily Caller (Oct. 12, 2012, 12:57 PM), http://bit.ly/12ixFZu.
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by including both men and women in virtually all of the major institutions
and sectors of our society. A long line of cases acknowledges that gender
differences make different and distinctly valuable contributions to society in innumerable ways that enrich society by the inclusion of both
men and women in virtually all of the major institutions and sectors of
our society.50 It is too late in the history of our constitutional jurisprudence to deny that the law recognizes the fact that men and women are
different in innumerable, profound, and socially significant ways. Likewise, it is futile to deny that an intimate domestic union of two men or
of two women creates a different kind of domestic relationship with
importantly different qualities and characteristics than the marital union of a man and a woman. That those differences do not justify many
forms of legal discrimination (such as in difference-irrelevant kinds of
employment and eligibility for difference-neutral government benefits) simply underscores that there are very real gender differences.
The second (marital essentials) proposition also fails as a matter of
constitutional doctrine. The appendices overwhelmingly show that in
U.S. interstate comparative constitutional law, the integration of male
and female is considered to go to the essence of marital relations and
is the core and fundamental element of the social institution of marriage. As a matter of global principles and comparative international
constitutional law, respect for the importance of integrating genders
in marriage is even greater. If gender-integration is not a ubiquitous
requirement for marriage in the nations of the earth, it is undeniably
the pervasively prevailing, and nearly-ubiquitous requirement of marriage in the world today. And until just a dozen years ago it was historically the constant, unexcepted, ubiquitous marriage requirement in all
societies through all history.51 Thus, the application of the equality

50. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971); Taunya Lovell Banks, Thurgood Marshall, the Race Man, and Gender Equality in the
Courts, 18 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 15, 19–20 (2010) (“According to one study, between 1971,
when the Court in Reed v. Reed invalidated on equal protection grounds a state law preferring
men over women as administrators for estates, and 2002, the Supreme Court decided forty-one
cases involving gender employment discrimination claims.” (citation omitted)); Justin Driver, The
Constitutional Conservatism of the Warren Court, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 1101, 1116 (2012).
51. See Wardle, Blakesley & Parker, supra note 48, §§ 2:46–2:48 (discussing physical
requirements for marriage including dual-gender union); Robert P. George, What’s Sex Got to Do
With It? Marriage, Morality, and Rationality, 49 Am. J. Juris. 63, 73 (2004); Sherif Girgis, Robert
P. George & Ryan T. Anderson, What Is Marriage?, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 245, 247 (2010).
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principle in U.S. constitutional law should justify (and usually has justified) the limiting of legal marriage to dual-gender couples.52
Moreover, judicially interpreting equal protection provisions of
the Constitution in a way that mandated legalization of same-sex marriage would contradict and undermine core principles of American
constitutionalism. The Founders of the U.S. Constitution, and the
eighteenth-century Republican political theory upon which they drew
in drafting the Constitution, emphasized the importance of democratic
processes and recognized the simultaneous need for and risks of
“parchment” protections of fundamental, inalienable human rights.
The Founders were very leery of relying for protection from
abuses of government tyranny on mere “parchment barriers”—mere
words put down on some revered “parchment.”53 They preferred to
rely instead upon the solid protection of structure.54 That is one of the
principal reasons for the Founders’ objection to and rejection of any
listing of a “Bill of Rights” in the original Constitution of 1787.55

52. See McConnell v. United States, 188 Fed. App’x 540, 542 (8th Cir. 2006); Citizens for
Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 870–71 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating there was a good
reason for the restraint displayed in Baker); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1304–05 (M.D.
Fla. 2005) (holding that Baker constitutes binding precedent requiring dismissal of case); Adams
v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (stating that Baker was controlling, but
that court would reach same conclusion de novo); Lockyer v. San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 504
(Cal. 2004) (stating that Baker sets forth federal constitutional law with respect to same-sex marriage, and not undermined by Lawrence); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 19–20 (Ind. App.
2005) (stating that Baker shows the Court did not think Loving supported argument by same-sex
couples); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 17 n.4 (N.Y. 2006); Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp.,
802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (App. Div. 2005) (finding Baker binding precedent on equal protection
issue); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 999 (Wash. 2006) (following Baker in rejecting
claim of constitutional right to same-sex marriage). See also Dale M. Schowengerdt, Defending
Marriage: A Litigation Strategy to Oppose Same-Sex “Marriage,” 14 Regent U. L. Rev. 487 (2002)
(reviewing court decisions holding that prohibiting same-sex marriage does not violate Equal
Protection); Lynn D. Wardle & Lincoln C. Oliphant, In Praise of Loving: Reflections on the “Loving Analogy” for Same-Sex Marriage, 51 How. L.J. 117, 139 (2007) (analyzing Loving’s analogy to
racial anti-miscegenation laws).
53. This memorable phrase was the language of James Madison. See John C. Eastman,
Philosopher King Courts: Is the Exercise of Higher Law Authority Without a Higher Law Foundation
Legitimate?, 54 Drake L. Rev. 831, 832 (2006) (citing Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 5 The Writings of James Madison 271–72 (G. Hunt ed., 1964)).
54. See Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 84, in The Essential Federalist and
Anti-Federalist Papers 301 (David Wootton ed., 2003).
55. See Eastman, supra note 53, at 832; Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 657. 666–67 (2011); Richard G.
Wilkins, The Structural Role of the Bill of Rights, 6 BYU J. Pub. L. 525, 531–32 (1992).

508

489]

Equality Principles

James Madison expressed those concerns most famously in The Federalist No. 10,56 where he explained the need to divide governmental
power to structurally set power against power to prevent tyranny by
any branch of government.57
Madison doubted that constitutional rights could do much to prevent
political majorities or other powerful factions from having their way.
Rights that protected the politically weak against the politically
strong would be unenforceable; they would simply be disregarded or
overridden. Justifying to Jefferson his opposition to a bill of rights,
Madison argued that “experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of
rights on those occasions when its controul is most needed. Repeated
violations of these parchment barriers have been committed by overbearing majorities in every State.”58

Fellow Virginian James Randolph likewise declared, “I have no
faith in parchment.”59 Another delegate to the Virginia Constitutional
Convention, Abel Upshur, likewise declared that no “paper guarantee
was ever yet worth any thing, unless the whole, or at least a majority
of the community, were interested in maintaining it.”60 Roger Sherman, the Connecticut delegate to the Philadelphia Convention of 1787
explained: “No bill of rights ever yet bound the supreme power longer
than the honeymoon of a new married couple, unless the rulers were
interested in preserving the rights . . . .”61 Other Founders shared and
expressed similar views.62
One of the grave objections to including a bill of rights in the Constitution was that “the enumeration might unwittingly expand the
power of the federal government. In Hamilton’s words, a bill of rights
56. James Madison, The Federalist No. 10, in The Essential Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers 167 (David Wootton ed., 2003).
57. Id.; see also Eastman, supra note 53, at 833.
58. Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 55, at 666–67 (quoting Letter from James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in Jack N. Rakove, Declaring Rights 160, 161
(1998).
59. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 Yale L.J. 1286, 1299 (2012) (citing 42 Annals
of Cong. 2361 (1824)).
60. Levinson, Rights and Votes, supra note 59, at n.40 (citing Jesse T. Carpenter, The
South as a Conscious Minority, 1789–1861: A Study in Political Thought 141 (1990)).
61. Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 55, at 721 (citing Roger Sherman, A
Countryman, II, New Haven Gazette (Nov. 22, 1787), reprinted in Essays on the Constitution of the United States 218, 219 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892)) (emphases omitted).
62. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787, 376–
82 (1969) (citing Noah Webster); see also Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 55, at 666–
68.
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containing ‘various exceptions to powers not granted’ might ‘afford a
colorable pretext to claim more than were granted.’”63 In factin ways
not fully foreseen or explicitly considered by the Foundersthe Bill of
Rights, and some other constitutional provisions, including the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, have afforded
courts enormous policy-making powers to legislate and make policy
decisions (under the cloak of interpreting those provisions) that the
Founders intended to be made by the people and their elected representatives.
Many constitutional scholars agree. Professor John Hart Ely is
joined by many others who share the Madisonian perspective that the
truly essential, and lasting, part of the Constitution “is a design of government with powers to act and a structure arranged to make it act
wisely and responsibly. It is in that design, not in its preamble or its
epilogue, that the security of American civil and political liberty lies.”64
As Professor Eastman has explained:
In the end, Madison and other opponents of a bill of rights agreed to
propose amendments once the new Constitution was ratified, and
they proceeded to honor that pledge in the First Congress. But Madison drafted the new amendments with great care so as not to create
the implication that they were merely “abridgements of prerogative
in favor of privilege” or “stipulations between kings and their subjects.” Rights were not granted by the Bill of Rights but recognized,
echoing back to the Declaration’s claim of inalienable rights.65

Application of the “equal protection” provision has proven to be
susceptible to the same kinds of abuses that led to such reticence to
adopt and care in defining the Bill of Rights. Similar prudence and care
is needed in interpreting the equal protection provision lest it become
a tool for the illegitimate judicial imposition of same-sex marriage
upon reluctant citizens.
C. Equality Claims as Justifications for Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage in
Other Countries
While the equality claims for same-sex marriage in the United

63. Wilkins, supra note 55 (citing The Federalist, No.84 (Alexander Hamilton)).
64. Herbert J. Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in Toward a More Perfect Union 108, 128 (Joseph M. Bessette ed., 1995); see also Levinson, Parchment and Politics,
supra note 55, at 667 n.18; Wilkins, supra note 55, at 530–33.
65. Eastman, supra note 53, at 833 (emphasis in original).
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States have emphasized equality-as-equal/equivalent or equality-as-respect, in Europe the equality claims have primarily emphasized equality-as-tolerance. For example, the first nation to legalize same-sex
marriage was the Netherlands, which has a long, proud, prominent
tradition of tolerance. “From the very beginning, tolerance as a cultural concept was relevant to how officials were supposed to relate to
morally ambivalent questions. [For example,] [i]n the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, tolerance meant that those in power accepted
the existence of religious views that were not compatible with official
doctrine.”66 Perhaps the condition of the country (i.e., small, below sea
level, religiously pluralistic, a trading nation, etc.) nurtured the development of tolerance as a core principle of the Dutch.67 Even today, the
Dutch are leaders in social and legal tolerance of many behaviors that
are strictly prohibited in most other nations because of their unique
understanding of “tolerance.” Legally, in the Netherlands,
[T]olerance refers to policies of nonprosecution of things forbidden
in the Criminal Code or other codes. Gedogen is the current Dutch
word . . . . This form of tolerance is not necessarily the same as “indifference.” Nor is it necessarily “turning a blind eye.” Ordinarily it
means that administrative or punitive reactions are postponed if the
perpetrator agrees to act according to precise instructions.68

Some commentators suggest that the Dutch generally are uninterested in moral analysis, which they associate with religion, because
they view themselves as nonreligious69—the Dutch way of dealing with
moral questions is to not ask questions, instead taking a “live and let
live” attitude.70 Thus, clearly Dutch legalization of same-sex marriage
connotes no endorsement, acceptance, or embracing of same-sex marriage, but expresses a recognition of the value of setting aside differences in order to promote a common end for the good of the political
66. Ybo Buruma, Dutch Tolerance: On Drugs, Prostitution, and Euthanasia, 35 Crime &
Just. 73, 76 (2007) (emphasis added); see also Isaak Kisch, The Netherlands: Caution and Confidence
in a Democratic Society, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 830, 834 (1954).
67. Buruma, supra note 66, at 78 (“[T]olerance was forced on people who were living together. Much of the land is below sea level. It had to be reclaimed from the sea by hardworking
people from all religions. They had to work together—even if they considered one another heretics or heathens.”).
68. Id. at 85.
69. See Kisch, supra note 66, at 833–34; see also Herbert Hendin, The Dutch Experience, 17
Issues L. & Med. 223, 243–44 (2002).
70. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Why the Netherlands?, 30 J.L. Med. & Ethics 95, 100
(2002).
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community.71
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes that
“[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and
is entitled to protection by society and the State.”72 Similar statements
about the foundational importance and specially-protected role of
families are found in dozens of other international conventions, compacts, and instruments.73 Some examples include the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,74 the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,75 the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,76 the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,77 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.78
Advocates of same-sex marriage have long argued that these documents should be interpreted to provide a right to same-sex marriage.
Those claims have been notably unsuccessful. These human rights
charters have not been interpreted as requiring member states to redefine marriage to include same-sex couples. For example, in 2002 in
Joslin v. New Zealand,79 the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee affirmed that the internationally recognized civil right of marriage

71. Buruma, supra note 66,66 at 80–81.
72. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 16(3), G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). See Jane Adolphe, The Holy See and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights: Working Toward a Legal Anthropology of Human Rights and the Family, 4 Ave Maria
L. Rev. 343 (2006); Don Browning, The Meaning of Family in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, in 1 The Family in the New Millennium 38 (A. Scott Loveless & Thomas B. Holman
eds., 2007); Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 73 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1153 (1998).
73. See Lynn D. Wardle, Federal Constitutional Protection for Marriage: Why and How, 20
BYU J. Pub. L. 439 app. II, at 483 (2006) (listing 35 international treaties, charters, conventions,
and other instruments with provisions acknowledging the importance of families or marriage).
74. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 23, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
75. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 10 § 1, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
76. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
77. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct.
25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=24. The Convention became enforceable on Dec. 1,
1983. 28: Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
HccH.net, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.statusprint&cid=24 (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
78. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
79. Joslin v. New Zealand, Commc’n No. 902/1999, Human Rights Committee, 75th
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created by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
confers the obligation on states “to recognize as marriage only the union between a man and a woman wishing to marry each other.”80 This
became the touchstone of understanding these human rights documents, and the various member states have been left to determine for
themselves what recognition will be given other domestic relationships. Similarly, in Rees v. United Kingdom,81 the European Court of
Human Rights held that the right to marry, as protected by the European Convention on Human Rights,82 applies only to “traditional marriage,” leaving the individual states free to individually determine the
nature and degree of recognition to extend to other relationships.83
In 2010 in Schalk v. Austria,84 the European Court of Human
Rights held definitively that the European Convention on Human
Rights does not require member countries to legalize or even recognize same-sex marriages. Upholding the Austrian government denial
of the two gay petitioners’ request to legally contract a marriage, and
agreeing with the Austrian court’s holding that disallowance of samesex marriage did not violate the Convention, the European Court held
that the Convention did not confer or protect any right to same-sex
marriage:
The Court observes that, looked at in isolation, the wording of Article 12 might be interpreted so as not to exclude the marriage between
two men or two women. However, in contrast, all other substantive
Articles of the Convention grant rights and freedoms to “everyone”
or state that “no one” is to be subjected to certain types of prohibited
treatment. The choice of wording in Article 12 must thus be regarded
as deliberate. Moreover, regard must be had to the historical context
in which the Convention was adopted. In the 1950s marriage was
clearly understood in the traditional sense of being a union between
partners of different sex.85

Sess., July 8–26, 2002, CCPR/C/75/D/902/1999 (July 30, 2002).
80. Id. at 11 para. 8.2.
81. Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986).
82. European Convention on Human Rights, Sept. 3, 1953, ETS No. 5, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Basic+Texts/The+Convention+and+additional+pr
otocols/The+European+Convention+on+Human+Rights/.
83. Rees, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R at para. 49.
84. Schalk v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R., HUDOC (24 June 2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-99605.
85. Id. at para. 54–55.
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Similarly, the Court ruled that the Convention’s non-discrimination article,86 “Article 14[,] taken in conjunction with Article 8, a provision of more general purpose and scope, cannot be interpreted as
imposing such an obligation [to legalize same-sex marriage] either.”87
Petitioners claimed also that Article 14 was violated because even
though they now could register their partnership in Austria, they were
“discriminated against as a same sex-couple on account of certain differences conferred by the status of marriage on the one hand and registered partnership on the other.”88 The Court of Human Rights rejected that claim noting the margin of appreciation accorded states,
and the lack of consensus within Europe on the point, that registered
partnerships in Austria were “a legal status equal or similar to marriage
in many respects” with “only slight differences in respect of material
consequences, [but] some substantial differences . . . in respect of parental rights.”89 However, it was important to the Court to note that
the scheme “corresponds on the whole to the trend in other member
States [in Europe].”90 Therefore, the Court concluded that there was
“no violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with
Article 8.”91
Just this year, that interpretation of the Convention was reconfirmed. In March 2012, the European Court of Human Rights declared in Gas v. France92 that “Article 12 of the Convention does not
impose an obligation on the governments of the Contracting States to
grant same-sex couples access to marriage.”93 While it is to be expected
that some pro-same-sex union developments will come in the future—
given the political nature of the issue—the consistent, overwhelming

86. Article 14 must be considered the equality provision of the European Convention; it
is a non-discrimination provision barring discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms secured by the Convention. “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.” European Convention on Human Rights, supra note
82, at art. 14.
87. Schalk, Eur. Ct. H.R., HUDOC, at para.101.
88. Id. at para. 107.
89. Id. at para. 109.
90. Id.
91. Id. at para. 110.
92. Gas v. France, Euro. Ct. H.R., HUDOC (15 March 2012), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-109571.
93. Id. at para. 66; see also Donna Bowater, Gay Marriage is not a Human Right, According to
European Ruling, Telegraph (Mar. 21, 2012), http://bit.ly/14PKRWr.
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rejection of the claim for same-sex marriage in the global arena to this
point is noteworthy.
Thus, as a matter of comparative constitutional law and international law, the trend to legalize same-sex marriage seems to have stalled
(though it is inching forward—in a total of ten nations in the past
twelve years). The trend now seems to be against same-sex marriage,
with the sole regional exception of a few jurisdictions in Western Europe and a few former European colonies in North America and elsewhere. The global norm is not to recognize same-sex marriage, but to
protect as a matter of international human rights the ability of each
nation to settle that policy issue for itself.

IV. Why the General Jurisprudential Theory of
Equality Supports the Constitutional
Claims for Same-Sex Marriage
Equality can be said to include and be designed to achieve (protect)
tolerance.94 As the roots of the word suggest, tolerance includes the notion of reciprocity—a reciprocal “bear[ing] with” someone or something undesired, and a mutual self-restraint regarding the tolerated activity, condition, or situation.95 The dilemma of equality and tolerance
as legal principles in modern liberal democracies is that there must be
some positive value, some virtue, that motivates and justifies the tolerance and equal protection of ideas and practices that others conclude
are wrong, dangerous, bad, and harmful. History is filled with too
many examples that show that relying on the personal virtue, self-control, and endurance of individuals, their ability to “put up” with and
co-exist with wrongs and those who advocate and practice them, is not
sufficient to produce genuine, let alone long-lasting, tolerance or
equality.
Toleration, as Bernard Williams once remarked, is an “impossible

94. In this regard, I modestly diverge from Professor Steven D. Smith’s otherwise excellent analysis and critique of equality. He sees equality as a value distinctly different from and
competing against tolerance, and calls for a revival of tolerance. See SMITH, supra note 1; Smith,
supra note 2. I see equality as having both equality-as-tolerance dimensions and equality-as-neutrality distortions.
95. See Anthony Esolen, Tolerance and Reciprocity, Pub. Discourse (Sept. 21, 2012),
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/09/6452 (“The Latin tol- is related to a group of words
having to do with carrying a burden: German dulden, to be patient, to endure; Old English tholian,
to suffer; Latin tuli, I have borne. When we tolerate we bear with someone or something; we bear
the existence of a wrong . . . because . . . to protest would invite a greater wrong”).
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virtue.” It is impossible because it involves accepting, and abiding or
accommodating views that one rejects. It calls us to live in cognitive
dissonance and presents contradiction as a sought after goal. We are
obliged to “bear” what in fact we find unbearable. Of course, if we
did not find this, that, or the other word or deed objectionable, there
would be no call to tolerate them. . . . Viewed from one perspective
then, tolerance is indeed a virtue so demanding as to be “impossible”
of realization, perhaps even logically untenable, involving us in the
laws of contradiction.
. . . [T]olerance is far from being a sufficient virtue. . . . Tolerance,
with its historical associations of suffering the presence of what is detestable . . . is too feeble a thing to promote.96

Reliance upon the “grin-and-bear-it” virtue of citizens and government officials produces only temporary and unstable tolerance and
shallow and limited equality. Thus, Professor Steven Smith has described two flaws with the neutral-equality ideal in modern liberalism:
First, without an accepted set of substantive values—an orthodoxy—
the ideals of neutrality and equality are incapable of guiding or constraining public policy. Thus, public neutrality toward substantive
values can never be achieved. Second, even if such neutrality could
be achieved, a regime committed to value-free neutrality or equality
would be incapable of commanding the respect and loyalty of its citizens. In short, substantive neutrality is impossible; and even if it were
possible, it would be morally insupportable.97

96. Adam B. Seligman, Tolerance, Tradition and Modernity, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1645,
1646 (2003) (footnote omitted) (citing Bernard Williams, Toleration: an Impossible Virtue 18–28 (David Heyd ed., 1996)).
97. Smith, supra note 2, at 313. Professor Smith posits that modern equality jurisprudence
developed in three stages, beginning with adoption of the principles of tolerance (most notably
and influentially expressed by John Locke in his 1689 work, A Letter Concerning Toleration), but
that liberal thinkers later substituted equality for tolerance in order to provide broader protection
for unpopular minorities (most notably and influentially James Madison in his writings protecting
religious liberty). That focus on equality led to the adoption of neutrality-as-equality, the attitude
of state neutrality and the official adoption of a policy of ‘equality’ towards all competing groups.
“In the eyes of the state, or of the law, all groups and individuals are entitled to ‘equal concern
and respect’ regardless of their political ideology, religious faith, or moral commitments.” Smith,
supra note 2, at 311; see also Smith, supra note 1, at 11–20.
Without disputing his first and third points, Smith’s second point might be contested. That is, it
is possible to read Madison as suggesting that full equality is a defining element of toleration, and
not as substituting equality for toleration. Thus, it is possible to reconcile toleration and equality
as two sides of the same coin rather that cast them as different, competing values. In this interpretation, the only real and significant conceptual change occurred when the notion of toleranceas-equality morphed into the notion of equality-as-substantive-neutrality.
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That probably is why many wise philosophers from Greek to modern times have taught “that without a shared conception of justice,
genuine political community is impossible.”98
But commitment by the polis to any shared substantive value or
principle as the basis for equality or tolerance creates a conundrum, for
it would exclude tolerating and giving equal protection to the ideas and
persons that reject the underlying substantive value. What principle
can provide the “shared value” that can sustain tolerance and equality?99 Liberty provides the solution to the conundrum of equality and
tolerance. Liberty is at least a procedural principle, protecting as a matter of recognizing the separate and independent jurisdiction, the sovereignty of other individuals under the rule of law in the political community, to decide for themselves important matters. Liberty justifies
tolerance because it commands respect for the sovereign dignity of all
members of the community—for us, as well as all others. Protection of
our own liberty is linked to and dependent upon equal protection of
the liberty of all other members of the polis. Thus, because we honor
liberty, we tolerate bad ideas and practices that others are at liberty to
live and advocate; because our own valued liberty is implicated, we
equally protect the liberty of others to make choices that we believe
are bad, wrong, and even harmful.
But liberty does not mean the right of any individual to do whatever he or she wants, whenever and however and to whomever he or
she wants. The founders of the American republic were very interested
in protecting individual liberties as well as protecting society, and they
described some clear boundaries of individual liberty; they defined
them in terms of protecting the political community. Later, John Stuart Mill articulated his classic modern liberal definition of the limits of
individual liberty in terms of not harming others.100
A. The Distortions of “Equality”
While equality has been a core, distinguishing characteristic and
ideal of the American republic since its earliest days, the dangers of

98. Smith, supra note 2, at 327 (citing A. Macintyre, After Virtue 244 (2d ed. 1984));
see also id. at 328 (“[A] healthy political community must stand for something. If it does not, then
it becomes a mere aggregation of jarring individual atoms; politics and government become a
battleground, and law, to those who lack the power to dictate its content, will be mere coercion.”).
99. See Smith, supra note 1, at 143 (suggesting that genuine mutual respect is the necessary common value for sustaining equality-as-tolerance).
100. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 9 (Hackett Publishing Co. 1978) (1859).
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distorting the ideal of equality have been apparent from the beginning
of our constitutional democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville famously reported in Democracy in America101 that Americans enjoyed an unprecedented “equality of condition”102 in their new nation, but noted the
underlying tension between the principles of liberty and equality.103
De Tocqueville celebrated that the ideal democratic nation is one in
which the citizens “will be perfectly free, because they will all be entirely equal, and they will all be perfectly equal because they will be
entirely free.”104 But, he warned that their passion for equality would
overcome their passion for liberty: “[T]hey call for equality in freedom; and if they cannot obtain that, they still call for equality in slavery.”105
More recently, Professor Peter Western explained that equality is
an “empty” idea lacking substantive content;106 it is a formal concept
only and thus useless for deciding any significant issue.107
Equality simply means that like cases should be treated alike—a
proposition with which no one really disagrees. What people do disagree about is whether some particular case really is like some other
case in relevant respects. But the notion of equality does nothing to
help resolve that sort of disagreement.108

Equality justification actually obfuscates the substantive contest and
masks the true basis for the resolution of the issue.109 As Professor Steven D. Smith puts it: “If we see controversial issues being debated

101. 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Henry Reeve, trans., Phillips
Bradley, ed., Alfred A. Knopf, 11th ed. 1972) (1835).
102. Id. at 3.
103. 2 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 96 (Henry Reeve, trans., Phillips Bradley, ed., Alfred A. Knopf, 11th ed. 1972) (1840).
104. Id. at 94.
105. Id. at 97; see also Alexis de Tocqueville Quotes, Goodreads, http://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/465.Alexis_de_Tocqueville (last visited Mar. 30, 2013) (“Americans are
so enamored of equality, they would rather be equal in slavery than unequal in freedom.”); (“[I]t
every day renders the exercise of the free agency of man less useful and less frequent; it circumscribes the will within a narrower range and gradually robs a man of all the uses of himself. The
principle of equality has prepared men for these things; it has predisposed men to endure them
and often to look on them as benefits.”); (“[T]here are no surer guarantees of equality among
men than poverty and misfortune.”).
106. Peter Western, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982).
107. See id. at, 566–67.
108. Smith, supra note 1, at 13.
109. See id. at 13–14.

518

489]

Equality Principles

mainly in terms of what ‘equality requires,’ in short, we will have reason to suspect in advance that some kind of cheating—or deception,
or self-deception—is going on.”110
Thus, as a matter of jurisprudential principles, the principle of
equality only masks the real reasons for resolving, one way or another,
the controversy over legalizing same-sex marriage. What is needed is
a discussion of the values, virtues, moral goods and purposes, and social
interest in marriage. As Michael Sandel argues, whether same-sex marriage should or should not be legalized requires “recourse to controversial conceptions of the purpose of marriage and the goods it honors.”111 As a matter of moral analysis, the question turns on the nature
and purposes of the social institution of legal marriage and on the qualities and characteristics of same-sex and opposite-sex couples. As Professor Sandel asserts: “The debate over same-sex marriage is fundamentally a debate about whether gay and lesbian unions are worthy of
the honor and recognition that, in our society, state-sanctioned marriage confers. So the underlying moral question is unavoidable.”112
Since equality analysis only masks and obscures those underlying social
and moral questions, it impedes rather than facilitates the intelligent,
coherent resolution of the same-sex marriage issue.
Finally, the cost of establishing an equality claim for same-sex marriage is the destruction of the very institution of marriage that the
equality claim seeks to make accessible to same-sex couples. Only by
devaluing and diminishing marriage, only by neutralizing and abandoning the core, historic (still nearly-ubiquitous globally) dual-gender
value component of the institution of marriage might those equality
principles provide meaningful support for same-sex marriage
claims.113 Yet, “[a]s Alexander Bickel explained: ‘. . . valueless institutions are shameful and shameless and, what is more, man’s nature is

110. Id. at 14.
111. Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? 253 (2009); see also
Russell Muirhead, Minerva’s Owl” The Tradition of Western Political Thought. By Jeffrey Abramson,
89 Tex. L. Rev. 671, 683–85 (2011) (reviewing, inter alia, Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What’s
the Right Thing to Do? (2009)), Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Respecting Freedom
and Cultivating Virtues in Justifying Constitutional Rights, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1311, 1321–27 (2011);
Jeffrey Abramson, Book Reviews, Justice Takes a Stand, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 653, 655–662 (2011) (reviewing SANDEL).
112. Sandel, supra note 111, at 254.
113. See Thieme, supra note 49.
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such that he finds them, and life with and under them, insupportable.’”114

V. Conclusion
This paper has revealed that in most legal systems, including most
American states and most federal constitutional jurisprudence, as well
as in the law and jurisprudence in most other nations, equality principles do not require legalization of same-sex marriage as a matter of
constitutional or fundament human rights doctrines. Rather, only in a
few legal systems, equality doctrines have been interpreted to require
legalization of same-sex marriage.
Equal protection and tolerance, based on respect for individual liberty in our constitutional system might require some legal recognition
or protection of some status and benefits for same-sex couples who
otherwise satisfy the commitments and other essential requirements of
unions that contribute significantly to the social good. But equal protection and tolerance do not require disregarding the importance of
the core, essential value of gender-integration in marriage.
The risk of equality jurisprudence is its tendency to obfuscate the
real issues, and to make real, competing interests. Whether equality
notions require legalization of same-sex marriage ultimately depends
upon identifying and understanding the nature and goods of the institution of marriage, and upon our best assessment of how well samesex couples contribute to the nature and goods of the institution of
marriage, especially as compared to male-female couples. Those matters should be examined and discussed openly and transparently, not
behind the veil of equality that obscures the issues and not through the
surrogate language of equality notions.
Likewise, the equality-as-tolerance claim for same-sex marriage
depends upon liberty and the limits of liberty (whether liberty should
include the liberty to marry a same-sex partner). The limits of liberty
are set by a determination of the harmful impacts of its exercise upon
other persons and institutions in society (e.g., whether same-sex marriage will harm or weaken the institution of marriage or persons in
society). Again, open, transparent, full, respectful discussion is needed
to make that assessment.
These are difficult and delicate questions on which reasonable persons may hold very strong and differing viewpoints. Because the issues
114. Smith, supra note 2, at 328.
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matter deeply and differently to different people, there is a constant
temptation to resort to strident rhetoric that is accusatory, including
charging those who disagree with being judgmental or motivated by
ulterior motives (including animus or ideological blindness). That kind
of rhetoric certainly chills and discourages the important civic dialogue
that needs to occur in order for us to reach a responsible decision. As
Judge Thomas B. Griffith put it:
Disagreement is critical to the well-being of our nation. But we must
carry on our arguments with the realization that those with whom we
disagree are not our enemies; rather, they are our colleagues in a
great enterprise. When we respect each other enough to respond
carefully to argument, we are filling roles necessary in a republic.115

Open, full, serious, vigorous, respectful dialogue about these difficult and sensitive issues is essential not only to answering rightly the
question whether equality requires legalization of same-sex marriage,
but also whether process is an essential component of equality itself.
It would be a misuse and abuse of the equal protection guarantee
for judges to interpret it as constitutionally mandating the legalization
of same-sex marriage. Determinations about what marriage means and
which of many different forms and styles of adult relationships and living arrangements properly merit the legal status of marriage under our
Constitution are for the people to decide, either by their elected representatives or directly.
The structural dimension of equal protection protects the right of
all citizens to have an equal opportunity to influence and equal power
to determine public policy on such fundamental issues as whether to
redefine marriage to include same-sex couples. The 2012 elections
have shown that the issue can be fairly and properly decided through
democratic processes. Judicial interpretation of the equal protection
clause—a provision that was intended to protect the rights of persons
from unjust discrimination—deprives the people of the right to protect
their marriages and to preserve the social institution of marriage as the
gender-integrating institution it has been for millennia. This deprivation would be a distortion of the equal protection provision and would
be profoundly and harmfully ironic.

115. Thomas B. Griffith, The Work of Civility, BYU Mag., Fall 2012, available at
http://magazine.byu.edu/?act=view&a=3076.
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Appendix I: The Legal Acceptance of Same-Sex Marriage
and Unions in the United States and Globally
Legal Status—31 December 2012116
A. Legal Allowance of Same-Sex Unions in the United States
Same-Sex Marriage Is Legal in Nine U.S. States (18%), the
District of Columbia, and Two Indian Tribes
Connecticut
Iowa
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
New Hampshire

New York
Washington117
Vermont
District of Columbia
Coquille Tribe
Suquamish Tribe118

116. See Recognition of Same-Sex Couples Worldwide, Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in the
United States, Lambda Legal, http://data.lambdalegal.org/publications/downloads/fs_recognition-of-same-sex-couples-worldwide.pdf (last updated Mar. 29, 2011), Status of Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide, Lambda Legal, http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/articles/nationwide-status-same-sex-relationships.html (last modified June 8, 2012), Bea Verschraegen, The
Impact of European Family Law on National Legal Systems, in 2 Central and European Countries after and Before the Accession 63, 63–65 (2011); cf. Jennifer C. Pizer & Sheila
James Kuehl, The Williams Institute, Same-Sex Couples and Marriage (Aug. 2012),
available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Pizer-Kuehl-Model-Marriage-Report.pdf.
117. The question of whether to legalize same-sex marriage was decided by voters in Maine,
Maryland, and Washington in November, 2012, and voters in Minnesota decided whether to
adopt a constitutional amendment barring same-sex marriage.
118. Two of 564 U.S. Indian tribes allow same-sex marriage while six have banned it. Trista
Wilson, Comment, Changed Embraces, Changes Embraced? Renouncing the Heterosexist Majority in
Favor of a Return to Traditional Two-Spirit Culture, 36 Am. Indian L. Rev. 161, 177–78 (2012)
(“The two largest Native American tribes, the Cherokees and the Navajos, both passed legislation
prohibiting same-sex marriage. . . . Four other tribes passed legislation limiting marriages to those
between a man and a woman: the Sault Tribe of Chippewa Indians, located in Michigan; and the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation, Iowa Tribe, and Chickasaw Nation, all located in Oklahoma. . . . [But
i]n 2008, the Coquille Tribe of Oregon became what is believed to be the first tribe to extend
marriage rights to same-sex couples, so long as one of the partners is a tribal member. In August
2011, the Suquamish Tribe, located in Washington, also extended full marital rights to same-sex
couples.”).
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Same-Sex Unions Equivalent to Marriage (“Civil Unions”) Are
Legal in Eight U.S. States (20%) and the District of Columbia.
California119
Nevada
New Jersey
Oregon
Illinois

Hawaii
Delaware
Rhode Island
District of Columbia120

Same-Sex-Union Registry and Specific, Limited Benefits in
Two More U.S. Jurisdictions.
Colorado

Wisconsin

119. California formerly had same-sex marriage by judicial decree for about four-and-onehalf months in 2008 before the voters passed Proposition 8, rejecting same-sex marriage.
120. Some civil unions may be superseded by legislation legalizing same-sex marriage if it
is approved. California and Nevada call them “domestic partnerships” but in substance they are
marriage-equivalent civil unions. See supra notes 11, 35. Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, and the District
of Columbia also allow heterosexual couples to contract civil unions, but same-sex marriage may
eventually replace civil unions.
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Same-Sex Marriage Is Permitted in Ten (or Eleven) Nations.121
The Netherlands
Belgium
Canada
Spain
Norway

Sweden
Portugal
Iceland
Argentina
Denmark
(and arguably South Africa)

Same-Sex Unions Equivalent to Marriage Are Allowed in Seventeen or Sixteen Other Nations (9%).122
Ecuador
Finland
France
Germany
Luxembourg
South Africa
Slovenia
Andorra

Brazil
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Uruguay
New Zealand
Austria
Ireland
Liechtenstein
and (most of) Australia123

Same-Sex Partnerships (Formal but Not Equal to Marriage)
Are Allowed in Five or More Nations.
Columbia
Croatia
Czech Republic

Hungary
Israel

121. A civil union has most or all of the same legal qualities of marriage but is called something else. E.g., South Africa had legalized same-sex “civil unions,” which can be can be created
by way of “marriage” and can be called “marriages,” but the Marriage Act was unamended to
only allow male-female marriage. See Civil Union Act 29441 of 2006 (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=67843; see also Lynn D. Wardle, The Proposed Minnesota Marriage Amendment in Comparative Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure,
Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y (forthcoming Spring 2013). Same-sex marriage also is allowed in
sub-jurisdictions of some nations (e.g., the USA (certain states), Mexico (City) and by specificcase court decisions in others (Brazil)). Some nations recognize foreign same-sex marriages but
do not allow same-sex marriages to be contracted domestically.
122. See supra note 13 (re South Africa).
123. Same-sex cohabitation is recognized in all Australian states and territories, and registration of such civil unions is permitted in most states and territories of Australia. Civil unions
also are allowed in several states in the United States, and in some other sub-jurisdictions, like
Greenland
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Appendix II: The Legal Rejection of Same-Sex Marriage
and Unions in the United States and Globally
Legal Status—31 December 2012124
A. Legal Rejection of Same-Sex Unions in the United States
Thirty-one States (62%) and Six Indian Tribes Prohibit
Same-Sex Marriage by Constitutional Amendment.
Twenty States (40%)* Also Ban Civil Unions.
Alaska
Alabama*
Arkansas*
Arizona
California
Colorado
Florida*
Georgia*
Hawaii
Idaho*
Kansas*

Kentucky*
Louisiana*
Michigan*
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska*
Nevada
North Carolina*
North Dakota*

Ohio*
Oklahoma*
Oregon
South Carolina*
South Dakota*
Tennessee
Texas*
Utah*
Virginia*
Wisconsin*125

Cherokee Tribe
Navajo Tribe
Sault Tribe
Muscogee Tribe
Iowa Tribe
Chickasaw Tribe

124. See Recognition of Same-Sex Couples Worldwide, Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in the
United States, Lambda Legal, http://bit.ly/10yiHcV (last updated Sept. 12, 2011), Status of SameSex Relationships Nationwide, Lambda Legal, http://bit.ly/Za6uIQ (last modified June 8, 2012),
Bea Verschraegen, The Impact of European Family Law on National Legal Systems, in 2 Central
and European Countries after and Before the Accession 63, 63–65 (2011); cf. Jennifer
C. Pizer & Sheila James Kuehl, Same-Sex Couples and Marriage, The Williams Institute (Aug.
2012), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Pizer-KuehlModel-Marriage-Report.pdf.
125. The asterisk (*) indicates that civil unions are also banned. The pound symbol (#)
means that the amendment is structural. In addition to the states that have adopted marriage
amendments, in Maine in 2009 the “People’s Veto” vote overturned a law allowing same-sex
marriage before the law took effect. Ben Brumfield, Voters Approve Same-Sex Marriage for the First
Time, CNN Politics (Nov. 7, 2012, 2:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/07/politics/polsame-sex-marriage/index.html. But, in November 2012, Maine voters narrowly legalized samesex marriage. Id. In May 2012, a state marriage amendment passed in North Carolina with over
61% of the vote. North Carolina Passes Same-Sex Marriage Ban, CNN Projects, CNN Politics
(May 11, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/08/politics/north-carolina-marriage/index.html.
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At Least 47 of 193 Sovereign Nations (24%) Have Constitutional Provisions Defining Marriage As a Union of Man and
Woman.126
Armenia (art. 32)
Azerbaijan (art. 34)
Belarus (art. 32)
Bolivia (art. 63)
Brazil (art. 226)
Bulgaria (art. 46)
Burkina Faso (art. 23)
Burundi (art. 29)
Cambodia (art. 45)
China (art. 49)
Columbia (art. 42)
Cuba (art. 43)
Democratic Republic of Congo (art.
40)
Ecuador (art. 38)
Eritrea (art. 22)
Ethiopia (art. 34)
Gambia (art. 27)
Honduras (art. 112)
Hungary (art. M - April 2011)
Japan (art. 24)
Latvia (art. 110 - Dec. 2005)
Lithuania (art. 31)
Malawi (art. 22)
Moldova (art. 48)

Mongolia (art. 16)
Montenegro (art. 71)
Namibia (art. 14)
Nicaragua (art. 72)
Panama (art. 58)
Paraguay (arts. 49, 51, 52)
Peru (art. 5)
Poland (art. 18)
Romania (art. 48)
Rwanda (art. 26)
Serbia (art. 62)
Seychelles (art. 32)
Somalia (art. 28)
South Sudan (art. 15)
Spain (art. 32, disregarded or overturned by legislation)
Sudan (art. 15)
Suriname (art. 35)
Swaziland (art. 27)
Tajikistan (art. 33)
Turkmenistan (art. 25)
Uganda (art. 31)
Ukraine (ark. 51)
Venezuela (art. 77)
Vietnam (art. 64)127

126. See Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (1997) Cap. 383, 7, § 8, art. 19 (H.K.), available at http://bit.ly/X810ng. The Spanish law allowing same-sex marriage—in facial violation of
the constitution—was upheld by the country’s highest court. See Carmen Garcimartín, The Spanish Law on Same-Sex Marriage: Constitutional Arguments, 27 BYU J. Pub. L. 399 (2013) (this
symposium); Iciar Reinlein & Sarah Morris, Same-Sex Marriage Upheld by Spain’s Highest Court,
Reuters (Mar. 29, 2012), http://reut.rs/YtDylo.
127. Constitutions, supra notes 21, 24-26; Political Constitution of the State 2009, art. 63
(Bolivia); Constitution of the Republic of Burundi Mar. 18, 2005, art. 29; Constitution of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo Feb. 18, 2006, art 40; The Constitution of Mongolia Jan. 13,
1992, art. 16(11); Political Constitution of the Republic of Panama Oct. 11, 1972, art. 58; Constitution of Romania Oct. 29, 2003, art. 48; Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda Jun. 4, 2003,
art. 26; Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles Jun. 21, 1993, art. 32; Harmonized Draft

526

489]

Equality Principles

Constitution for the Republic of Somalia Jun. 12, 2012, art. 28; Spanish Constitution Dec. 27,
1978, art. 32; Interim Nat’l Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan Jul. 6, 2005, art. 15; see
Political Constitution of Colombia, art. 42 (the family “is formed . . . by the free decision of a man
and woman to contract matrimony” (emphasis added)); Constitution of Japan, art. 24 (“Marriage
shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual
cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis.” (emphasis added)); “ . . .”Constitution of Latvia, Feb. 15, 1922, ch. VIII, art. 110 (“The State shall protect and support marriage—
a union between a man and a woman[.] . . .” (emphasis added)); Constitution of the Republic of
Uganda, Oct. 8, 1995, art. 31 (“Marriage between persons of the same sex is prohibited.” (emphasis
added)).
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